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Summary 
The passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act (P.L. 104- 104) resulted in a 
major revision of the Communications Act of 1934 (47U.S.C. 15 1 et seq.) to address 
the emergence of competition in what were previously considered to be monopolistic 
markets. Although less than a decade has passed, a consensus has grown that existing 
laws that govern the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors have become 
inadequate to meet the Nation's changing telecommunications environment. 
Technological changes such as the advancement of Internet technology to supply 
data, voice, and video, the transition to digital television, as well as the growing 
convergence in the telecommunications sector have, according to many 
policymakers, made it necessary to consider another "rewrite" or revision, of the 
laws governing these markets. 
What role the 109"' Congress may play in such a revision remains unclear. 
While there seems to be a growing consensus for reform, there are some, including 
those representing the cable television industry, who question the need for a 
significant revision. Regardless of the final outcome, Congress has taken and is 
expected to continue to pursue an active role in examining and debating the issues 
related to a possible revision of existing telecommunications law. 
This report provides an overview of selected topics which the 109"' Congress 
may address in its examination of telecommunications issues. While far from a 
definitive list, the issues selected are wide-ranging and touch upon topics central to 
the telecommunications reform debate. The issues included in this report cover: 
broadband Internet regulation and access; broadcast indecency: digital television 
transition; Federal Communications Commission structure and reform; intercarrier 
compensation; media ownership rules; municipal deployment of broadband; public 
safety communications, the "savings clause" and n~onopoly issues; spectrum 
auctions; and universal service fund reform. 
This report addresses major issues, rather than addressing specific legislative 
activity. The underlying references to CRS products, included at the end of each 
issue, should be used to expand upon the issue, update relevant events and, where 
appropriate, track Congressional activity. This report will be updated occasionally. 
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Communications Act Revisions: Selected 
Issues for Consideration 
Introduction 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the 1996 Act), signed into law on 
February 8, 1996 (P.L. 104- 1 O4), represented the first major rewrite of our nation's 
telecon~munications policy. The 1996 Act redefined and recast the Communications 
Act of 1934(1934 Act) (47U.S.C. 15 1 et.seq.) to address the emergence of competition 
in what were previously considered to be monopolistic markets. Despite its relatively 
recent enactment, however, a consensus has been growing that the 1996 Act fails to 
adequately address the convergence and technological changes now facing the 
telecommunications and broadcasting sectors. Although many policymakers (as 
well as the popular and trade press) have labeled efforts to revise existing 
telecommunications law "the rewrite or revision of the 1996 Act," in actuality the 
revisions being considered are likely to go beyond what is included in the 1996 Act 
and will add to and modify the underlying statute which is the 1934 Act. 
What role the 109"' Congress may play in such a revision has yet to be 
determined. Whether Congress will introduce a single, comprehensive measure, as 
was the case in the 1996 Act, or continue to introduce stand-alone. incremental 
measures, which may, or may not, be incorporated into a single consolidated bill is 
unknown. Furthermore, whether a consensus can be formed that a revision is 
necessary andlor will be actively pursued, what form such a revision might take, and 
the timing of a revision remains unclear. Regardless of the outcome of legislative 
proposals. however, Congress has taken, and is expected to continue to take, an 
active role in examining and debating the issues that such a revision may entail. 
This report provides an introduction to selected issues which might be 
considered if Congress chooses to revise telecommunications law. While far from an 
exhaustive list, the following issues have been selected for discussion due to their 
relevance and prominence in the current telecommunications reform debate: 
broadband Internet regulation and access; broadcast indecency; digital television 
transition; Federal Communications Commission structure and reform; intercarrier 
compensation: media ownership rules; municipal deployment of broadband; public 
safety communications; the "savings clause" and monopoly issues; spectrum 
auctions; and universal service fund reform. Other issues such as taxation, privacy, 
and copyright, to name a few, while of equal in~portance, go beyond the scope of this 
report and may be found in other CRS products. This report is not a tool for tracking 
legislation. The underlying references to CRS products included, if available, at the 
end of each issue, should be used to update relevant events and, to track 
Congressional activity. This report will be updated occasionally. 
Broadband Internet Regulation and ~ c c e s s '  
Broadband Internet access gives users the ability to send and receive data at 
speeds far greater than conventional "dial up" Internet access over existing telephone 
lines. Broadband technologies - cable modem, digital subscriber line (DSL), 
satellite, and fixed wireless Internet - are currently being deployed nationwide 
primarily by the private sector. While President Bush has set a goal of universal 
broadband availability by 2007, some areas of the nation, particularly rural and 
low-income communities, continue to lack full access to high-speed broadband 
Internet service. In order to address this problem, the 109th Congress is considering 
the scope and effect of federal broadband financial assistance programs (including 
universal service), and the impact of telecommunications regulation and new 
technologies on broadband deployment. 
Some policymakers, believing that disparities in broadband access across 
American society could have adverse economic and social consequences on those left 
behind, assert that the federal government should play a more active role to avoid a 
"digital divide" in broadband access. One approach is for the federal government to 
provide financial assistance to support broadband deployment in underserved areas. 
Others, however, question the reality of the "digital divide," and argue that federal 
intervention in the broadband marketplace would be premature and, in some cases, 
counterproductive. The regulatory treatment of broadband technologies, whether 
offered by traditional or emerging providers, or incumbents or new entrants, has also 
become a major focal point in the debate. Whether present laws and subsequent 
regulatory policies are necessary to ensure the development of competition and its 
subsequent consumer benefits, or are overly burdensome and only discourage needed 
investment in and deployment of broadband services, continues to be at issue. The 
policy debate focuses on a number of issues including the extent to which legacy 
regulations should be applied to traditional providers as they enter new markets; the 
extent to which legacy regulations should be imposed on new entrants as they 
compete with traditional providers in their markets; and, the appropriate treatment 
of new and converging technologies. 
Finally, emerging broadband technologies - such as wireless (including "3G", 
"wi-fi" and "Wimax") and broadband over power lines (BPL) - continue to be 
developed andlor deployed and have the potential to affect the regulatory and market 
landscape of broadband deployment. Congress and the FCC will likely consider 
policies to address the emergence of these and other new broadband technologies. 
For Further Information 
CRS Issue Brief IB10045, Broadband Internet Access: Backgrotmd and Issues 
CRS Report RL307 19, Broadband Internet Access and the Digital Divide: Federal 
Assistance Progvums 
CRS Report RL3242 1, Broadband over Powerlines: Regulator?, and Policy Isst~es 
' Lennard G. Kruger, Specialist in Science and Technology, and Angele A. Gilroy, 
Specialist in Telecommunications Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division 
CRS Report RS20993, Wireless Technology and Spectrum Demand: Advanced 
Wireless Senices 
Broadcast Indecencyz 
Two prominent television events in the past two years have placed increased 
attention on the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and its broadcast 
indecency regulations. The airing of an expletive during the 2003 Golden Globe 
Awards and the subsequent ruling of the FCC's Enforcement Bureau, coupled with 
the controversy surrounding the 2004 Super Bowl half-time show, have brought 
broadcast indecency to the forefront of the congressional agenda. During the 109th 
Congress, several bills have been introduced to increase the penalties imposed for 
broadcast indecency and prohibit the broadcast of certain words and phrases. 
Legislation to apply the broadcast indecency regulations to cable television is also 
being considered. 
Title 18 of the United States Code makes it unlawful to utter "any obscene, 
indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication"(18 U.S.C. 1464). 
Violators of this provision are subject to fines or imprisonment of up to two years. 
The FCC has the authority to enforce this provision by forfeiture or revocation of 
license. The Commission's authority to regulate material that is indecent, but not 
obscene, was upheld by the Supreme Court in Federal Comnzz~nications Commission 
v. Paczjca Fo~~nclation. Pursuant to the Court's decision, whether any such material 
is "patently offensive" is determined by "contemporary community standards for the 
broadcast medium." The Court noted that indecency is "largely a function of context 
- it cannot be judged in the abstract." 
In 1995, the FCC modified its indecency regulations to prohibit the broadcast 
of any material which is indecent on any day between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. These 
regulations have been enforced primarily with respect to radio broadcasts and thus 
have been applied to indecent language rather than to images. However, the 
Commission has recently initiated more enforcement actions against broadcast 
television. Broadcasts deemed indecent are subject to a forfeiture of up to $32,500 
per violation. Recently, the FCC has started to consider each utterance of an indecent 
word as a separate violation, rather than viewing the entire program as a single 
violation, which could lead to fines in excess of $32,500. Legislation being 
considered could increase the penalties to up to $500,000 per violation, and would 
also apply the increased penalties to performers as well as broadcast licensees. 
While the FCC has significantly increased its enforcement of the broadcast 
indecency regulations in recent years, some argue that the fines levied are so small 
that the broadcasters simply consider them a cost of doing business. Increased 
penalties imposed on broadcasters and performers are viewed as the only way to deter 
the airing of indecent programming. Others argue that the indecency regulations 
themselves have no constitutional justification and that imposing the increased fines 
on performers could have a chilling effect on free speech in violation of the First 
' Angie A. Welborn. Legislative Attorney, American Lam Dl\ ision 
Amendment. They also cite optional measures, such as the use of the V-chip, as a 
more appropriate way to protect the public from what they may feel is inappropriate 
material. 
For Further Information 
CRS Report RL32222, Regulation of Broadcast Indecency: Backgrozmd and Legal 
Analysis 
CRS Report RL32729, V-Chip and TV Ratings: Monitoring Children's Access to 
TV Programming 
Digital Television   ran sit ion^ 
Digital television (DTV) is a new television service representing the most 
significant development in television technology since the advent of color television. 
DTV can provide sharper pictures, a wider screen, CD-quality sound, better color 
rendition, multiple video programming ("multicasting") or a single program of high 
definition television (HDTV), and other new services currently being developed. 
Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (P.L. 104- 1 O4), existing broadcasters 
were issued DTV licenses while at the same time retaining their existing analog 
licenses during the transition from analog to digital television. The 1996 Act 
required broadcasters to eventually return either their existing analog channel or the 
new digital channel. The simultaneous broadcasting ("simulcasting") of the same 
programs in both digital and analog modes was intended to allow viewers who have 
not yet purchased DTV sets or converters to continue to receive television 
programming during the transition to DTV. If and when analog signals are turned 
off, consumers will not be able to receive over-the-air television broadcast signals 
unless they have a digital television or connect their existing analog televisions to 
converter boxes. 
Congress and the FCC set a target date of December 3 1,2006 for broadcasters 
to cease broadcasting their analog signals and return their existing analog television 
spectrum to be auctioned for commercial services (such as broadband) or used for 
public safety communications. However, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 
105-33) allows a station to delay the return of its analog spectrum if 15% or more of 
the television households in its market do not subscribe to a multi-channel digital 
service and do not have digital television sets or converters. 
Given the slower-than-expected pace that digital televisions have been 
introduced into American homes, few observers believe that the goal of digital 
televisions in 85% of American homes by 2006 will be reached, with the result that 
- under current law -television stations will continue to broadcast both analog 
and digital signals past the 2006 deadline. The 109"' Congress is debating whether 
and how a "hard date" for the DTV transition should be implemented, thereby freeing 
' Lennard G. Kruger, Specialist in Science and Technology, Resources, Science, and 
Industry Division. 
reclaimed analog spectrum for public safety and commercial uses, while at the same 
time raising auction revenues for federal budget deficit reduction. 
A key issue in the digital transition is how to address the millions of American 
over-the-air households whose existing analog televisions will require converter 
boxes in order to receive digital signals - if and when the analog signal is turned off. 
Related policy questions include should some form of financial assistance (subsidies 
or tax credits, for example) be provided by the federal government to enable over- 
the-air households to purchase converter boxes or digital televisions? How would 
such a program be administered, and should assistance be provided to low-income 
households exclusively or to all households? Should subsidies, if warranted, be 
financed by proceeds garnered by auctioning the analog spectrum? And finally, how 
much funding would a subsidy program require, and how much revenue is likely to 
be raised by auctioning the commercial portion of the reclaimed analog spectrum? 
Another contentious issue related to the digital television transition is whether 
cable providers should be mandated to carry broadcasters' multicasted programming 
streams. A related issue is the extent to which cable providers should be required to 
carry "downconverted" versions of digital broadcast signals that could be viewed by 
the many cable households who are expected to continue to use analog televisions 
after the transition. 
For Further Information 
CRS Report RL3 1260, Digztul Television: An Overview 
CRS Report RS222 17, The Digital TV Transition: A Brief O v e r v l e ~ ~  
CRS Report RL32622, Public Safep, Interoperabilih and the Transition to Digital 
Televi~ion 
CRS Report RS22218, Spectrum Use and the Transition to Digital TV 
CRS Report RS22 106, Copjv-ight Protectiorz of Digztul Television: The "Broadcast 
Flag " 
Federal Communications Commission Structure 
and ~ e f o r m ~  
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an independent Federal 
agency directly responsible to Congress, is charged with regulating interstate and 
international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. Since 
it was established by the Communications Act of 1934, Congress has periodically 
called for varying degrees and types of FCC reform. The FCC has taken internal 
actions, most recently in 2002, to restructure itself in an attempt to improve its ability 
to oversee and regulate the changing telecon~munications sector. However, some 
policymakers believe that the FCC has not met the needs of a changing 
telecommunications industry. If Congress undertakes a significant effort to revise 
' Patricia Moloney Figliola, Specialist in Teleco~mnunications and Internet Policy, 
Resources. Science, and Industry Division. 
existing telecommunications law, it could consider addressing provisions to further 
modify the FCC's structure and duties. 
Suggestions for reform have ranged from modest reorganization to total agency 
abolishment. Other proposals include replacing the five commissioners with a single 
"telecommunications czar" and downsizing the agency by eliminating its regulatory 
functions and transforming it into an enforcement agency. More recently, the 
proposals for reform that have been suggested can be broadly grouped into two 
categories: (1) procedural changes made within the FCC or through Congressional 
action that would affect the agency's day-to-day operations, or (2) substantive policy 
changes requiring Congressional action that would affect how the agency regulates 
different services and industry sectors. 
Some experts have suggested a number of procedural changes. One suggestion 
is to limit the time between the adoption and actual public release of an order. For 
example, the FCC often adopts orders and issues press releases with a summary of 
the order weeks or even months prior to releasing the order itself. Such a delay, 
critics claim, often results in confusion among the affected industry segments. Some 
policyrnakers are discussing instituting a "shot clock," which would require the FCC 
to issue the actual order within a set time frame once the order is adopted and a press 
release issued. Another procedural change which has gained support from a variety 
of policyrnakers, calls for the amendment of the Sunshine Act (P.L 94-409) 
requirements for meetings among commissioners. Current law limits to two the 
number of commissioners that may meet outside the construct of an "official open 
meeting." While the intent of the law is to promote open discussion of issues, some 
contend that it may actually hinder discussion and inhibit the ability to forge 
compromises. Other procedural changes include limiting the time allowed to 
complete actions on license transfers for mergerslsales and license renewals and 
developing new and stronger enforcement mechanisms. 
Even with what appears to be strong Congressional interest in FCC reform at 
this time, the substantive changes which some believe are needed to enable the FCC 
to effectively regulate the converged telecommunications industry may remain 
difficult to achieve. Without a congressional mandate for change, the FCC may find 
it difficult to conduct its work under the current structure and restrictions of the 1934 
Act. If Congress chooses to revise the 1934 Act it may wish to consider what 
changes, if any, are needed to enable the FCC to perform its duties in a changing 
telecommunications environment. 
For Further Information 
CRS Report RL32589, The Federal Communications Commission: Czlrrent Stnlctul-e 
and its Role in the Changing Telecomnzz~nications Landscape 
lntercarrier Compensation5 
lntercarrier compensation refers to the payments that carriers make to one 
another when more than one carrier's network is used to complete a telephone call 
or other electronic communication. Under current statutory requirements and 
regulatory rules, these payments vary widely (from 0.1 cents to 5.1 cents per minute), 
even though in each case basically the same transport and switching functions are 
provided. Payments depend on two factors: the classification of the interconnecting 
party (i.e., whether the entity is a local exchange carrier, a long distance carrier, a 
wireless carrier, or an information service provider); and the classification of the 
service (i.e., whether the service is telecommunications or information, local or long 
distance, or interstate or intrastate). The Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) is currently examining proposals to modify the intercarrier compensation 
system and Congress may also wish to address this issue and provide guidance as part 
of its review of existing telecommunications law. 
As markets move from a regulated monopoly towards a competitive model, 
nondiscriminatory intercarrier compensation reform is considered to be vital to the 
development of a competitively neutral regulatory regime. There is general 
agreement that in today's competitive environment, such reform is needed, but the 
details of how this should be accomplished remain open to debate. There is 
consensus, however, that the system as currently designed tends to have the 
following negative effects: distorts investment and undermines efficient competition 
by providing artificial advantages/disadvantages to service providers; stifles 
innovation by causing uncertainty about the intercarrier compensation regime to 
which new services will be subject; encourages providers to make business decisions 
based on the artificial rates set for intercarrier compensation, rather than on true 
underlying costs; discourages carriers from offering large baskets of minutes or 
unlimited calling at a fixed price, contrary to the preference of many consumers; 
requires carriers to expend millions of dollars and scarce information technology 
resources developing systems to identify, or dispute, the classification of traffic; and 
undermines the stability of universal service subsidy funds. 
At the same time, in some quarters, there is resistance to comprehensive 
intercarrier compensation reform because of concerns that some carriers and some 
consumers may be harmed by the changes. Reform is likely to result in an increase 
in end-user subscriber line charges, (i.e., the fixed charges that all subscribers pay on 
a monthly basis to connect to the telecomniunications network). Various consumer 
groups argue that the shifting of such costs from carriers to consumers would unfairly 
burden low-usage and low-income customers. Refonn also is likely to reduce the 
intercarrier compensation revenues of rural local exchange carriers, placing further 
pressure on the Universal Service Fund (USF), a mechanism which is currently 
facing its own issues. (See section on Universal Service Fund Reform, below.) 
Furthermore, reform is likely to require modification of intrastate intercarrier 
compensation rates, which lie within the jurisdiction of state regulatory commissions. 
'Charles B. Goldfarb, Specialist in Industrial Organization and Telecorninunications Policy. 
Resources, Science, and Industry Division. 
Some observers have questioned whether the FCC can undertake such reform 
without active state involvement. 
For Further Information 
CRS Report RL32889, Intercarrier Compensation: One Component of Telecom 
Reform 
Media Ownership Rules6 
The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC's) media ownership rules 
are intended to foster the three primary goals of U.S. media policy - competition, 
diversity of voices, and localism. These rules set restrictions on the number of 
broadcast television or radio stations an entity can own or control in a single market; 
the "cross-ownership" of newspapers and broadcast stations or of television and radio 
stations within a single market; and the number of broadcast television stations a 
single network can own nationally. The assumption underlying these rules is that 
undue consolidation of media ownership could harm competition, diversity, or 
localism. In 2003, the FCC adopted new rules that generally relaxed multi- 
ownership restrictions. The 108'~ Congress modified the national television 
ownership rule reducing the 45% ownership cap adopted by the FCC to 39%. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stayed and remanded the other FCC 
rules. In June 2005 the U.S. Supreme Court declined to consider an industry appeal 
of a case that overturned the FCC's rules. Congress may choose to provide guidance 
as the FCC rewrites its rules to meet the requirements of the Appeals Court. 
Some parties have argued that the rules now in place are not in the public 
interest because they block mergers that might be beneficial. For example, there may 
be situations in which a small-market television station could not afford to provide 
in-depth news coverage on its own, but could do so if it were allowed to combine its 
news gathering facilities and staff with a newspaper in the same market. More 
broadly, these parties claim that greater consolidation than is allowed under current 
rules would yield a more financially stable media sector better able to serve local 
communities. They argue that the Internet, cable television, satellite television, and 
satellite radio now provide enough independent media outlets in most locations to 
ensure competition, diversity of voices, and localism even if further consolidation 
were to occur. 
Others have argued that loosening current media ownership restrictions would 
result in mergers that would directly reduce the number of independent voices, lessen 
competition, and reduce local programming. They claim that the new technologies 
- Internet, cable, and satellite television and radio - provide very little local 
programming. 
"Charles B. Goldfarb, Specialist in Industrial Organization and Teleco~nmunications Policy, 
Resources, Science, and Industry Division. 
One key aspect of this debate is whether it is better to review proposed media 
mergers by using a "bright-line" rule that allows a combination to occur so long as 
the merged entity would not exceed the maximum number of media outlets an entity 
may own or control in a market; or by performing a case-by-case analysis of the 
market impact of each proposed merger. Proponents of a bright-line mle argue that 
such an approach provides certainty to the merging parties, as opposed to the 
uncertainty associated with a lengthy regulatory review. Proponents of case-by-case 
analysis claim that today's media marketplace is characterized by very large, 
vertically integrated companies that may own or control broadcast stations and 
networks, cable channels, program production studios, and even satellite or cable 
distribution networks. They argue that a simple bright line test fails to identify the 
unique impact on competition, diversity, and localism of a merger involving a large 
vertically integrated company. 
Since there are other public policies also intended to foster competition, 
diversity, and localism - for example, utilizing the spectrum more efficiently to 
create additional voices, fostering the development and deployment of new 
technologies that may provide additional voices, maintaining public interest 
obligations on existing broadcast licenses to foster localism - one part of the debate 
has been how the ownership rules and these other policies can work to reinforce, 
supplement, or substitute for one another. 
For Further Information 
CRS Report RL3 1925, FCC Media O~vnershiy Rules: Current Status and Issues 
for Congress 
CRS Report RL32460, Legal Challenge to the FCC's Mediu Ownership Rules: 
An Oven,iew of Pronzethezls Radio v. FCC 
Municipal Deployment of   road band^ 
One purpose of the 1996 Telecommunications Act of 1996 was to foster and 
encourage competition among providers oftelecommunications services. In the 1996 
Act, Congress barred states from "prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any 
interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." (47 U.S.C. 253 (a)). Some states 
have in recent years passed laws that prohibit or limit local governments from 
providing telecommunications services. An effort to challenge such a law in Missouri 
by municipalities offering local communications services in the state was heard 
before the U.S. Supreme Court in 2004 (Docket Number 02-1238). The Court ruled 
that "entity" was not specific enough to include state political divisions. If Congress 
wished to specifically protect both public and private entities, they could do so by 
amending the language of the law. This decision, plus the steady improvement in 
broadband conmunications technologies that municipalities wish to have available 
in their comnlunities, have provided fuel for a policy debate about access to 
broadband services. The central debate is whether municipal broadband services are 
Linda K. Moore, Analyst In Telecomnunlcations and Technology Pollcy. Resources. 
Science, and Industry. 
CRS- 10 
part of essential infrastructure - like electrical power or water - with many 
benefits, including stimulus to the local economy, or whether they provide unfair 
competition that distorts the marketplace and discourages commercial companies 
from investing in broadband technologies. 
The two main broadband technologies that are particularly attractive to 
communities (in part because they support existing community services such as 
Internet access for schools and communications for public safety) are fiber-optic- 
based networks and wireless access. The spread of wireless access to the Internet, 
commonly referred to as Wi-Fi, and anticipated advances in wireless technology are 
modifying the business case for broadband. Networks that depend on a fiber-optic 
cable backbone are capital-intensive and usually most profitable in high-density 
urban areas. A number of rural communities have used their resources to install 
fiber-optic broadband services in part because they were too small a market to 
interest for-profit companies. The technology for Wi-Fi costs less and has a wider 
geographic reach, broadening the size of potential markets for broadband. Most of 
the discussion about the municipal provision of broadband applies generally to all 
types of broadband services. However, it is the long-term profit potential of Wi-Fi 
and its successor technologies that are apparently spurring commercial wireless 
service providers to lobby against municipal competition. In particular, the fact that 
municipalities in urban areas are creating Wi-Fi networks and providing, among 
other services, free access to HotSpots (wireless links to the Internet) is viewed as a 
threat to commercial companies and a form of unfair competition. Many 
municipalities have installed free Wi-Fi zones (including New York and Chicago; 
one is planned for the entire city of Philadelphia). The cities argue that generally 
available access to the Internet through wireless connections has become an urban 
amenity, arguably a necessity, in sustaining and developing the local economy. 
Municipal Wi-Fi also provides the opportunity to improve social services and 
Internet access in disadvantaged communities that often are not served by fiber optic 
networks. 
The fierce debate around public-sector provision of what some consider to be 
a private-sector service is expected to continue. Increasingly, Congress can expect 
pressure from advocates from both sides to clarify the language of Section 243 or to 
take some other action that addresses the issue. 
For Further Information 
CRS Report RS20993. Wireless Technology and Syectmm Demand: Advanced 
Wireless Sewices 
Public Safety Communications8 
The lack of communications interoperability for first responders at the World 
Trade Center on September 1 1 ,  2001 has been widely recognized as a possible 
Linda K. Moore, Analyst in Telecormnunications and Technology Policy, Resources, 
Science, and Industry. 
contributing cause ofunnecessary deaths. The 91 1 1 Commission urged that Congress 
take prompt action to assure the release of spectrum at 700 MHz - allocated for 
public safety, but not released - to support needed interoperable networks. In the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, where failures in communications contributed to 
problems in rescue efforts, members of the 911 1 Commission, among others, 
expressed dismay that the essential first step toward the creation of a more robust 
emergency communications capability - the release of spectrum for wireless 
communications - has yet to be taken. In the current technological environment, the 
type of communications technology used is closely linked to the radio channels it 
uses. With few exceptions, public safety radios built to work on one band of 
frequencies cannot be used on other bands. Investment in emergency 
communications equipment and infrastructure is therefore dependent on appropriate 
spectrum allocation in order to be effective. 
New and emerging technologies have positioned wireless companies as equal 
competitors to broadcasters and cable companies, among others, in providing 
communications, information, and other services. The allocation and effective 
management of spectrum has become an essential component oftelecommunications 
policy as well as public safety policy. Congress is being urged by the public safety 
community and its supporters to assure the release of spectrum at 700 MHz (much 
of it encumbered by broadcasters that have not completed a planned transition to 
digital television) for public safety. It also could consider plans for future spectrum 
allocations that meet public safety needs as well as other uses such as commercial 
applications, defense, aviation, maritime activity, and medical telemetry. Congress 
might also consider the extent to which the current regulatory framework for 
telecommunications and other media helps or hinders social goals associated with 
public safety. Social benefits might include assuring access to wireline or wireless 
lifeline telecommunications, supporting 9 1 1 call centers, or expanding emergency 
alert networks. Broader-based policy decisions can also have an impact. For 
example, call centers and emergency alert systems can benefit from web-enabled 
communications capability; interoperability at all levels of communications benefits 
from digital technologies. 
The long-term goal for public safety communications is to create a seamless 
network of emergency communications that integrates every level of emergency 
response from the initial warning or call for help, through the process of rescue, and 
during the recovery stages. Congress currently tends to treat these aspects as discrete 
problems, with different policies. For example, at the federal level, some of the 
technical requirements for 91 1 calls are regulated by the Federal Communications 
Comn~ission (FCC) and some 91 1 programs receive funding from the Department 
of Transportation; federal planning for emergency alert systems occurs primarily 
within the Department of Homeland Security, with key technology provided by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); federal planning and 
funding for emergency con~munications is the responsibility of different directorates 
within the Department of Homeland Security; and spectrum planning is managed by 
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), at the 
Department of Commerce, and by the FCC. Spectrum policy for public safety is in 
turn bifurcated with the NTIA handling federal spectrum use and the FCC dealing 
with state and local public safety spectrum needs. 
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The "Savings Clause" and Monopoly lssuesg 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act contains an antitrust "savings clause" that 
specifically states that neither the 1996 Act nor any amendment to it should "be 
construed to modify, impair, or supercede the applicability of any of the antitrust 
laws" (section 601(b)(b), codified at 47 U.S.C. 5 152, note). In Verizon 
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko (540 U . S .  398 2004), the 
Supreme Court denied the antitrust claim advanced by a consumer of 
telecommunications services against a local exchange carrier (Verizon) that had 
previously been subject to regulatory discipline by both the Federal Communications 
Commission and the New York Public Service Commission. According to the Court, 
the fact that Verizon had been found to have breached its duty under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 to adequately share its network with 
telecommunications companies - including AT&T, which provided service to 
Trinko - wishing to provide competitive local exchange services did not provide 
sufficient basis for finding a violation of the antitrust laws. Despite the existence of 
the "antitrust-specific savings clause," the Court said, "the act does not create new 
claims that go beyond existing antitrust standards." 
Trinko was received unfavorably by both the chairman and ranking minority 
member of the House Judiciary Committee, and by numerous commentators and 
members of the so-called "competitive telecom industry." The ruling has also led to 
questions about its impact on the antitrust law's prohibition against monopolization, 
creating particular apprehension about the fate of the "essential facilities" 
("bottleneck,"with reference to telecommunications) doctrine. That doctrine, whose 
validity was seemingly questioned by the Trinko Court, has been thought to require 
that the proprietor of a facility deemed essential to a competitor's ability to compete 
share that facility with the competitor, assuming that such sharing is feasible and the 
competitor is not reasonably able to duplicate the facility. 
On the other hand, the chairman of the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee, who at that time was Representative Tauzin, received the decision with 
approval. In addition, there are those who believe that Trinko did no violence to the 
saving clause: they reason, as the Court appeared to, that absent the 1996 Act's 
imposition on local exchange carriers of the obligation to deal favorably with 
competitors, Verizon violated no existing obligation under the antitrust laws. In a 
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statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, made just prior to the decision, R. 
Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, 
noted that "passage of the 1996 Act did not have the effect of increasing any party's 
obligations under the antitrust laws," and that it is "important to preserve the 
distinction between a violation of the Telecommunications Act and a violation of the 
Sherman Act." 
If Congress chooses to address this issue as part of a possible revision of 
existing telecommunications law there are at least four options available. Congress 
could choose to allow the current law to remain unchanged with respect to the 
savings clause; it could amend the savings clause to clarify that the phrase, "the 
antitrust laws," means the literal words of the statutory provisions but excludes any 
judicial interpretation of them; it could amend the enforcement provisions of the act 
so that even if there had already been regulatory action, certain provisions of the act 
would remain enforceable by private individuals who are not competitors of LECs; 
or, it could characterize a violation of any (or some) mandatory, competitive 
obligation(s) of the act as prima facie evidence of violation of the antimonopoly 
provision of the antitrust laws (1 5 U.S.C. 2). The last three might have the effect 
of providing the breadth ofprivate action some members apparently thought they had 
assured in the 1996 Act. 
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Spectrum ~ u c t i o n s ' ~  
The Communications Act of 1934, as amended primarily by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, gives the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) the authority to allocate spectrum and 
to conduct auctions. This auction authority expires September 30,2007 (47 U.S. C. 
309 (j) (1 1)). 
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (47 U.S.C. 153) contained several spectrum 
management provisions. It amended Section 3096) of the Communications Act to 
expand and broaden the FCC's auction authority and to modify other aspects of 
spectrum management. Whereas previous statutes gave the FCC the authority to 
conduct auctions, the Balanced Budget Act required the FCC to use auctions to 
award ownership in nlutually exclusive applications for most types of spectrum 
licenses. The Telecon~munications Act of 1996 contains provisions about spectrum 
policies for broadcasters (47 U.S.C 336) and provides for the creation of a 
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Telecommunications Development Fund to receive interest earned on spectrum 
auction escrow accounts (47 U.S.C. 309 0) (8) (C)). 
Spectrum policy issues before Congress are characterized by economic, 
technological, and regulatory complexity. An increasing number ofpublic comments 
have criticized the effectiveness of spectrum management and policy in the United 
States. Questions regarding the role of auctions in spectrum management are of 
immediate concern because congressional authorization of the existing auction 
process expires in 2007. Proceeds from spectrum sales are presently attributed to 
general revenue in the U.S. Budget (47 U.S.C 309(j) (8) (A)). In the 108th Congress, 
however, a precedent was established with the creation of a Spectrum Relocation 
Fund (P.L. 108-494, Title 11), which holds proceeds from certain auctions in order to 
fund the relocation of government spectrum users to newly-assigned frequencies. 
The 1 OSth Congress also asked for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to 
prepare a study regarding the allocation of spectrum licenses, due by October 2005 
(P.L. 108-494, Title 11, Sec. 209 (a)). The conclusions of this report may lead to 
changes in spectrum policy and the auction process. Congress may also consider 
ways to free valuable spectrum currently occupied by broadcasters as part of a plan 
to encourage the move from analog to digital television (DTV). (See section on 
Digital Transition, above.) How to use the proceeds of auctions for all or some of the 
released spectrum is a subject of discussion in Congress. The funds might go, for 
example, to facilitate the transition to DTV, to fund public safety communications 
improvements, or to help decrease the budget deficit. The information and 
evaluations provided by the GAO to Congress will contribute to the broader 
discussion of policy tools for spectrum management and revenue creation through 
auctions and other means. 
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Universal Service Fund ~e form""  
The universal service concept, as originally designed, called on the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) to establish policies to ensure that 
telecommunications services are available to all Americans, including those in rural, 
insular, and high cost areas, at reasonable rates. The Telecommunications Act of 
1996 (P.L. 104- 104) not only codified this long standing commitment, but also 
expanded the concept to include, among other principles, that universal service 
support be made available to qualifying schools, libraries, and rural healthcare 
providers, and other nontraditional providers known as eligible telecommunications 
carriers (ETCs.). Over the years the universal service concept fostered the 
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development of various FCC policies and programs, and in 1983 an explicit 
Universal Service Fund (USF) was established to provide the necessary funding. 
There is a growing consensus, however, that the USF as presently designed, is no 
longer sustainable and universal service policies are threatened absent significant 
USF reform. 
Section 254 of the 1934 Communications Act requires the FCC to ensure that 
there be "specific, predictable and sufficient ... mechanisms to preserve and advance 
universal service." However, the growth of competition in the telecommunications 
marketplace coupled with technological advances have had a negative impact on the 
health and viability of the USF, as presently designed. While often leading to 
positive benefits to consumers and providers, these changes have led to a growing 
imbalance between the entities and revenue stream contributing to the fund and the 
growth in the entities and programs eligible to receive funding. The current policy 
debate has focused on three major concerns: who should contribute to and what 
methodology should be used to fund the program; eligibility criteria for benefits; and 
concerns over possible program fraud, waste, and abuse. One additional, but more 
narrowly focused issue, is the application of the Antideficiency Act (ADA) to the 
USF program. ADA compliance requires that agencies have cash on hand to cover 
all obligations, causing a conflict with the way some USF commitments are currently 
treated. 
While few question the commitment to the universal service concept, how this 
concept is currently defined, how these policies are funded, who should receive the 
funding, and how to ensure proper management and oversight of the fund remain 
open to discussion. While the FCC has taken (and will continue to take) action to 
sustain the USF, there is a growing consensus that legislation will be needed to fully 
address the modifications needed to not only ensure the viability of the USF, but also 
address the myriad issues surrounding USF reform. Members of both the Senate 
Commerce and House Energy and Comnlerce Committees have expressed a desire 
to address this issue and it is likely that USF reform will play a key role in any 
telecomnlunications refornl policy debate. 
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